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FIFTY YEARS WITH THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
REMAINS AN ENIGMA
James C. Thomast

I. INTRODUCTION

Today, some fifty years after Congress charted a procedural course with its
adoption of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),' scholars and students are
still following a twisted, perhaps even tortured, path in the area of judicial review, where the Chevron doctrine now dominates the legal landscape.2 This

doctrine of judicial deference to administrative agencies was first pronounced
by the Supreme Court on June 25, 1984. Since then, the case has been cited
and followed by the Court on numerous occasions.' It, therefore, seems appropriate that Chevron be viewed once again as part of the fifty-year anniversary
of the Administrative Procedure Act.
In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, the Court
adopted a two-step approach in the process of judicial review of an agency's
construction of the statute it administers First, the reviewing court must deter-

t

Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law.
1. See Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 5 U.S.C.). The measure proceeded through the Senate as S.7 to "improve the administration of
justice by prescribing fair administrative procedure," 92 CONG. REc. 2148 (1946), and was passed by voice
vote on March 12, 1946, 92 CONG. REc. 2167 (1946). Then S.7 advanced through the House of Representatives and was adopted on May 24, 1946, 92 CONG. REC. 5668 (1946). The enrolled bill was signed by the
Senate President pro tempore and by the Speaker of the House on May 29, 1946, 92 CONG. REC. 5881, 5954
(1946), and presented to the President on May 31, 1946, 92 CONG. REc. 6073 (1946). It was signed by President Harry S Truman on June 11, 1946, 92 CONG. REc. 6706 (1946).
2. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
3. During just the last two court terms of the Supreme Court, Chevron was cited at least ten times:
Lawrence ex rel. Lawrence v. Chater, 116 S. Ct. 604, 608 (1996); Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 116 S. Ct.
1396, 1401 (1996); Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 116 S. Ct 1730, 1733 (1996); NLRB v. Town &
Country Elec., Inc., 116 S. Ct. 450, 453 (1995); ICC v. Transcon Lines, 115 S. Ct. 689, 696 (1995); Director,
Office of workers' Comp. v. Newport News, 115 S. Ct. 1278, 1287 (1995); Stone v. INS, 115 S. Ct. 1537,
1555 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Reno v. Koray, 115 S. Ct. 2021, 2027 (1995); Babbitt v. Sweet Home
Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 115 S. Ct. 2407, 2411 (1995); Brown v. Gardner, 115 S. Ct.
552, 556 (1994).
4. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
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mine whether the statute falls under the clear and unambiguous rule in which
case the agency interpretation is given no deference. Specifically the Court stated, "If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress." While the Court adheres to the clear and unambiguous
rule, in a footnote to its exposition of the first part of the Chevron rule, the
Court held tightly to its clearly defined exclusive area of authority in the process of interpreting statutes. "The judiciary is the final authority on issues of
statutory construction," the Court said, "and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent."6
It is with the second step of the Chevron approach that so much commentary has been generated, unfortunately, without creating any greater level of
clarity.7 Therefore, commentators and courts have to keep trying the best they
can to make sense of the Supreme Court's Chevron analysis. This second step
of Chevron is triggered when "the court determines Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue."8 Therefore, "if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute."9 The scope of review then is whether the agency interpretation is "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute."'" With this limited review given to the agency's interpretation, "a court may not substitute its own
construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency."']
Does Chevron mean that the Court has surrendered to administrative agencies a degree of its Constitutional authority? A note on Chevron, published in
the American Bar Journal shortly after the opinion was released, described it as
a "spectacular administrative law decision." 2 Chevron was described as "the
Court's most complete statement to date about the deference owed to an
agency's interpretation of the statute it is charged with administering."' 3 This
landmark decision, according to the note, substantially increased the interpretative powers of the agency involved. The author concluded by stating, "[I]f
Congress has expressed only a general intent about the ends of the statute, the
court must defer to the agency's evaluation about what interpretation best fur5. Id. at 843.
6. Id. at 843 n.9. Cases cited by the Court in Chevron for the proposition of its exclusive authority
included: FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 32 (1981); SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S.
103, 117-18 (1978); FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1973); Volkswagenwerk v. FMC,
390 U.S. 261, 272 (1968); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291 (1965); FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380
U.S. 374, 385 (1965).
7. As of December 19, 1996, a WESTLAW search among law review articles of the term "Chevron
U.S.A." generated 2471 entries. Search of WESTLAW, JLR database (Dec. 19, 1996).
8. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 844.
11. Id.
12. Geoffrey P. Miller, Supreme Court Report: Six Cases Shape Business Law, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1985, at
124, 130.
13. Id.
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thers these ends. The court should reject the agency's interpretation only if it is
plainly outside the bounds of reason."' 4
Professor Cass R. Sunstein, of the University of Chicago, lifted Chevron to
the lofty level of Marbury v. Madison," upon which the sanctity of judicial
review of statutes is founded. 6 "[T]he decision," wrote Professor Sunstein,
"has established itself as one of the very few defining cases in the last twenty
years of American public law [that] ... has altered the distribution of national
powers among courts, Congress, and administrative agencies."' 7 He added: "If
Chevron allows agency interpretations to defeat well-established interpretative
principles, it will indeed have worked a revolution in the law."'" Kenneth
Starr, of "Whitewater" fame, further described Chevron as a "watershed decision" that "strengthened the deference principle."' 9 Associate Justice Antonin
Scalia, appearing at a symposium on Administrative Law at Duke University,
agreed with Professor Sunstein about the importance of that "watershed decision."' "Chevron," he said, "has proven a highly important decision - perhaps the most important in the field of administrative law since Vermont Yankee
2
Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC.11 i

Not all scholars have been equally impressed. Professor Bernard Schwartz
has expressed criticism of Chevron.22 He has written, "The Chevron doctrine
presents the danger of undue deference to self-expansion of an agency's jurisdiction ... particularly ... when an agency's power to act may be dependent

14. Id. at 132.
15. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
16. See Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 2071, 2074
(1990). Professor Sunstein had this to say about Chevron's linkage to Marbury v. Madison: "This principle
[Chevron] is quite jarring to those who recall the suggestion, found in Marbury v. Madison and repeated time
and again in American public law, that it is for judges, and no one else, to 'say what the law is."' Id. (footnote omitted).
17. Id. at 2075.
18. Id. at 2077.
19. Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 294 (1986).
Starr, as did Professor Sunstein, saw a linkage between Chevron and Marbury v. Madison: "Affording deference to an agency's legal analysis, however, seems facially contrary to the fundamental principle, incorporated
in Chief Justice John Marshall's broad dictum in Marbury v. Madison, that '[it is emphatically the duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is."' Id. at 283 (footnotes omitted).
20. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference To Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DuKE L.J.
511. Scalia, speaking at Duke University School of Law on January 24, 1989, told his audience, in jest no
doubt, that he had intended to talk about Bork's Senate confirmation hearings, "the proposed federal salary
increase, capital punishment, Roe v. Wade, and Law and Astrology." Id. at 511. That would have been a ponderous task even for Justice Scalia. The audience was spared such an arduous experience when Scalia was
reminded that his visit to Duke was to take part in a symposium on administrative law. But then he told the
audience: "Administrative law is not for sissies - so you should lean back, clutch the sides of your chairs,
and steel yourselves for a pretty dull lecture." Id.
21. Id. at 512. In Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. 519 (1978), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia issued an order requiring the Atomic Energy Commission, engaged in rulemaking, to conform to the
stricter procedural standard required for adjudication. See id. at 535-37. That court was faced with an argument from the environmental group that the agency preclusion of "'discovery or cross-examination' denied
them a meaningful opportunity to participate in the proceedings as guaranteed by due process." Id. at 541.
From this argument, the Court of Appeals framed the issue: "'Thus we are called upon to decide whether the
procedures provided by the agency were sufficient to ventilate the issues."' Id. The Supreme Court rejected
this as "Monday mroming quarterbacking." Id. at 547.
22. See Bernard Schwartz, Some Crucial Issues in Administrative Law, 28 TuLsA L.J. 793, 804-11
(1993).
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on findings involving statutory interpretation."' Now, with a little more than a
decade of Chevron behind us, it seems appropriate, during this fiftieth anniversary of the APA, to reexamine that doctrine of expansive deference to administrative agencies.
II. CONTEXT OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Prior to Congress providing more definite statutory guidelines for all federal agencies to follow with the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act,
courts had already made procedure an integral part to the very integrity of the
emerging field of administrative law. In fact, judicially created procedural innovations actually helped lead the courts away from the use of fiction to a more
enlightened foundation in response to delegation issues. To help understand the
meaning*of Chevron, it is important to establish the context under which all
administrative law principles must be examined.
A. ConstitutionalSeparation of Powers
The starting place in discussing this context is, of course, the constitutional
model that divides the power of government into three branches. 4 Separation
of powers is a structural manifestation in our federal Constitution: (1) "All
legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives; z (2)
"The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America;"26 and (3) "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish. '27 The constitutional drafters decided early
during the Federal Convention on this tripartition for the new government.
Assembled in a Committee of the Whole House, it was "[r]esolved that a national government ought to be established consisting of a supreme legislative,
judiciary, and executive."28 Such structural separation, which will be shown
served a functional purpose, was founded upon the political philosophy of such
critical thinkers as Montesquieu29 and John Locke.3"

23. Id. at 807. Professor Schwartz cites Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 184-87 (1991), as an example of
"how Chevron may skew the result in what would have once been a simple administrative-law case."
Schwartz, supra note 22, at 809.
24. See, e.g., Theodore Y. Blumoff, Separation of Powers and the Origins of the Appointment Clause,
37 SYRACUtSE L. REV. 1037 (1987); Morris D. Forkosch, The Separation of Powers, 41 U. COLO. L. REV. 529
(1969); Edward H. Levi, Some Aspects of Separationof Powers, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 371 (1976); Malcolm P.
Sharp, The ClassicalAmerican Doctrine of "The Separation of Powers," 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 385 (1935).
25. U. S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
26. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 1, Cl. 1.

27. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1.
28. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 30-31 (Max Farrand ed., Yale Univ.
Press 1937).
29. See MoNTESQUIEu, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS (T. Nugent transl. 1900), cited in Forkosch, supra note 25,
at 529. See also ANNE M. COHLER, MONTESQUIEU'S COMPARATIVE POLITICS AND THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN
CONSTITrUTIONALISM (1988); THOMAS L. PANGLE, MONTESQUIEU'S PHILOSOPHY OF LIBERALISM: A COMMEN-
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Montesquieu's work stood as a model for James Madison, who stoutly
defended a separation of powers as the "sacred maxim of free government."'"
In fact, Madison, in The FederalistNo. 47, cited Montesquieu in defense of the
division of powers in the new constitution. Madison wrote, "The accumulation
of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary in the same hands, whether of
one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny."32 Madison further echoed
Montesquieu's celebrated admonition that "'[there can be no liberty where the
legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or body of
magistrates,' or 'if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative
and executive powers."' 33
The Supreme Court has anchored this separation of powers political philosophy, expressed in The FederalistNo. 47, through a series of invariable reported decisions. In United States v. Klein,34 decided in 1871, the Court stated, "It
is the intention of the Constitution that each of the great co-ordinate departments of the government - the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial shall be, in its sphere, independent of the others."35 In 1879, the Court then
added the admonition, "One branch of the government cannot encroach on the
domain of another without danger. The safety of our institutions depends in no
small degree on a strict observance of this salutary rule."36
Contemporary cases have also shown the Court's consistency in recognizing the constitutional structural division of the powers of government into three
branches. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,37 the Court was confronted with President Harry S Truman's executive order directing the Secretary
of Commerce to take possession of and operate certain of the nation's steel
mills.3" Affirming the lower court's granting of plaintiffs' motion for tempoTARY ON THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (1973).
30. See JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT AND END OF CIVIL GOvERNMENT (1698), cited in Forkosch, supra note 24, at 529. See also Thomas P. Peardon, Introduction to J.

LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (Thomas P. Peardon ed., 1952).
31. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 331 (James Madison) (Cooke ed., 1961). See Sharp, supra note 24, at
385-93.
32. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 324 (James Madison) (Cooke ed., 1961). THE FEDERALIST included
eighty-five essays written by John Jay, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison between October, 1787 and
May, 1788 to convince the people of New York State to ratify the proposed Constitution. See GEORGE W.
CAREY, THE FEDERALIST: DESIGN FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC at xi (1989). Thomas Jefferson de-

scribed THE FEDERALIST as "the best commentary on the principles of government, which ever was written."
DAVID F. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST 1 (1984). Gottfried Dietze described the
value of THE FEDERALIST as follows: "The Federalistis a treatise on free government in peace and security. It
is the outstanding American contribution to the literature on constitutional democracy and federalism, a classic
of Western political thought." GOTrFRIED DIETzE, THE FEDERALIST: A CLASSIC ON FEDERALISM AND FREE
GOVERNMENT 3 (1960).
33. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 325 (James Madison) (Cooke ed., 1961).
34. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
35. Id. at 147.
36. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 99 U.S. 700, 718 (1878).
37. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
38. See id. at 583. President Truman issued Executive Order 10340, seizing the steel mills, on April 8.
1952, after determining that a threatened work stoppage due to a labor dispute endangered "American fighting
men ... now engaged in deadly combat with the forces of aggression in Korea." Id. at 590. His executive
order was appended to the Court's Youngstown decision. See id. at 589-92.
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rary injunction, the Supreme Court held the President had impermissibly encroached upon the exclusive constitutional domain of Congress. 9 Specifically,
the Court stated, "The Founders of this Nation entrusted the lawmaking power
to the Congress alone in both good and bad times."' Justice William 0.
Douglas, in his concurring opinion, added:
There can be no doubt that the emergency which caused the President to
seize these steel plants was one that bore heavily on the country. But the
emergency did not create power; it merely marked an occasion when
power should be exercised. And the fact that it was necessary that measures be taken to keep steel in production does not mean that the President, rather than the Congress, had the constitutional authority to act. 41
If exceptions could be made in times of emergency, the scheme sought by the
framers of the Constitution, to protect the liberty of people, would surely be
defeated. As Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Myers v. United States,42 said,
"The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of
1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power.q 43 He further added, "The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by means
of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers
among three departments, to save the people from autocracy."'
Protecting the people from autocracy points to the more functional side of
the structural division of powers among the legislature, executive and judiciary.
In its division of these powers, the constitutional convention envisioned the legislature as the superior branch with the court being the weakest. 4 In The Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton stated:
Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power
must perceive, that in a government in which they are separated from
each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be
the least dangerous to the political rights of the constitution; because it
will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them.'
Hamilton believed that "the general liberty of the people can never be endangered from that quarter ... so long as the judiciary remains truly distinct from
'
both the legislative and executive."47
It was with the judiciary's limited role in this constitutional sphere of
government, that the Framers considered it essential to give this department a

39. See id. at 585-86.
40. Id. at 589.
41. Id. at 629 (Douglas, J., concurring).
42. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
43. Id. at 293 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
44. Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
45. In THE FEDERALIST No. 78, Alexander Hamilton, comparing the relative power and authority of the
three division of government, concluded "that the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three
departments of power ..
" THE FEDERALIST No. 78 at 523 (Alexander Hamilton) (Cooke cd., 1961). Alexander Hamilton, in this essay, called upon the "celebrated Montesquieu" on this point: ."Of the three powers
above mentioned, the JUDICIARY is next to nothing."' See id.
46. Id. at 522.
47. Id. at 523.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol32/iss2/4

6

Thomas: Fifty Years with the Administrative Procedure Act and Judicial Re

1996]

JUDICIAL REVIEW REMAINS AN ENIGMA

level of independence not otherwise shared by the legislative or executive departments. Alexander Hamilton stated, "The complete independence of the

courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited constitution."' Judicial independence was accomplished by the Framers, first by language that judges
"hold their Offices during good Behaviour"'49 and that the judges will receive
compensation
"which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Of50
fice."
While the federal judiciary was given no constituency, the Congress, the
political body of government, was made clearly "dependent on the people
alone."'" James Madison defended this dependency that was structurally built
into the constitutional requirement that members of the House go before the
people every two years. "Frequent elections," Madison reasoned, "are unquestionably the only policy by which this dependence and sympathy can be effectually secured."52 In The FederalistNo. 39, Madison further explained the dependency of members of Congress. He noted, "The House of Representatives... is elected immediately by the great body of the people. The Sen' This inherent
ate ... derives its appointment indirectly from the people."53
dependence of Congress on the great body of people must also be read in the
context of the constitutional framers' decision that there be a republican form of
government instead of a direct democracy. 4
There was apprehension among the constitutional drafters that a government by direct democracy would be dominated by factions fueled by human
passion and inflamed with mutual animosity, "more disposed to vex and oppress each other, than to co-operate for their common good."55 James Madison,
in The FederalistNo. 10, spoke against a direct democracy and in favor of the
republican form of government. "[I]t may be concluded," Madison said, "that a

48. Id. at 524.
49. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. In THE FEDERALIST No. 78, Hamilton explained:
That inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the constitution and of individuals, which we
perceive to be indispensable in the courts of justice, can certainly not be expected from judges who
hold their offices by a temporary commission. Periodical appointments, however regulated, or by
whomsoever made, would in some way or other be fatal to their necessary independence.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 529 (Alexander Hamilton) (Cooke ed., 1961).
50. U.S. CONST. art III, § 1. In THE FEDERALIST No. 79, Alexander Hamilton stated, "Next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their
support." THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 531 (Alexander Hamilton) (Cooke ed., 1961). He added: "This provision for the support of the judges bears every mark of prudence and efficacy; and it may be safely affirmed
that, together with the permanent tenure of their offices, it affords a better prospect of their independence than
is discoverable in the constitutions of any of the states, in regard to their own judges." Id. at 532. It was similarly provided in Article II, that "[t]he President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a Compensation, which shall neither be encreased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have been elected."
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7. This was intended to provide to the President a level of independence from the
Legislature. See THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 492-93 (Alexander Hamilton) (Cooke ed., 1961).
51. THE FEDERALIST No. 52, at 354 (James Madison) (Cooke ed., 1961).
52. Id. at 355.
53. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 252 (James Madison) (Cooke ed., 1961). After April 8, 1913, with ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the Senate was also elected directly by the
people. See U.S CONST. amend. XVII, § I.
54. See U.S. CONST. art. IV. § 4. That section states: "The United States shall guarantee to every State in
this Union a Republican Form of Government ... " Id.
55. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 59 (James Madison) (Cooke ed., 1961).
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pure Democracy... can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction."56 He
elaborated on this fear of political disruption that would surely flow from a
system of politics structured upon the axiom of direct democracy. Madison
expounded:
A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a
majority of the whole; a communication and concert results from the form
of Government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to
sacrifice the weaker party, or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is, that
such Democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention;
have ever been found incompatible with personal security, or the rights of
property; and have in general been as short in their lives, as they have
been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized
this species of Government, have erroneously supposed, that by reducing
mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the
same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions,
their opinions, and their passions."
On the other hand, a republican form of government "opens a different
prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking." 8 Government
through elected representatives was expected to insure that the country would
be run by "a small number of citizens ... whose wisdom may best discern the
true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice, will be
least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations." 9 Madison
believed that "[u]nder such a regulation, it may well happen that the public
voice pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant
to the public good, than if pronounced by the people themselves convened for
the purpose. '
Additionally, a direct democracy was considered impractical in the expanding territory of the United States. How could the great body of people assemble
in one central place to conduct the business of government? In The Federalist
No. 14, Madison described the enormity of the problem:
As the natural limit of a democracy is that distance from the central
point, which will just permit the most remote citizens to assemble as often
as their public functions demand; and will include no greater number than
can join in those functions; so the natural limit of a republic is that distance from the center, which will barely allow the representatives of the
people to meet as often as may be necessary for the administration of
public affairs. Can it be said, that the limits-of the United States exceed
this distance?61

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 61.
Id. at 61-62,
Id. at 62.
Id.
Id.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 14, at 85 (James Madison) (Cooke ed., 1961).
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Still another defense of the republican form of government was the limited
power and function of a central government. Madison addressed this also in The
FederalistNo. 14:
In the first place it is to be remembered, that the general government
is not to be charged with the whole power of making and administering
laws. Its jurisdiction is limited to certain enumerated objects, which concern all the members of the republic, but which are not to be attained by
the separate provisions of any.62
Additionally, the tenure of office held by members of Congress was short.
"[W]e may," explained Madison, "define a republic to be... a government
which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the
people; and is administered by persons holding
their offices during pleasure, for
63
a limited period, or during good behaviour."
Finally came the question: "Who are to be the electors of the Federal Representatives?" ' The expansive answer was given by either James Madison or
Alexander Hamilton, appearing in The FederalistNo. 57:
Not the rich more than the poor; not the learned more than the ignorant;
not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than the humble sons
of obscure and unpropitious fortune. The electors are to be the great body
of the people of the United States. They are to be the same who exercise
the right in every State of electing the correspondent branch of the Legislature of the State.
Who are to be the objects of popular choice? Every citizen whose
merit may recommend him to the esteem and confidence of his country.
No qualification of wealth, of birth, of religious faith, or of civil profession, is permitted to fetter the judgment or disappoint the inclination of
the people.65
B. Supreme Court's Interpretationof the Separation of Powers
The Supreme Court has, for the most part, acknowledged and honored the
Constitutional structural division of power. Such acknowledgement is found in
the Court's enrolled bill doctrine, announced in Field v. Clarlc "The signing
by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and by the President of the
Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two
houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress."'67 Once the bill has gone
through this formal process, "its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable."6 This enrolled bill
doctrine, the Court explained, was commanded out of "respect due to [a] co-

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 86.
THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 251 (James Madison) (Cooke ed., 1961).
THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 385 (Alexander Hamilton & James Madison) (Cooke ed., 1961).
Id.
143 U.S. 649 (1892).
Id. at 672.
Id.
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equal and independent department" of government, despite what evils might
flow therefrom.69 It is, explained the Court, "'far better, that a provision should
occasionally find its way into the statute through mistake, or even fraud, than
that every act, state and national, should at any and all times be liable to be put
in issue and impeached by the journals, loose papers of the legislature and parol
evidence."' 7
Moreover, the Court has frequently admitted, in the over-all scheme of our
constitutionally divided government, its inability to provide relief. In Colegrove
v. Green,7 ' efforts to gain some. fair reapportionment of the congressional districts in Illinois was rebuffed by the Supreme Court. The Court stated:
We are of opinion that the appellants ask of this Court what is beyond its
competence to grant .... It has refused to [intervene in these legislative
controversies] because due regard for the effective working of our Government revealed this issue to be of a peculiarly political nature and therefore not meet for judicial determination. 2
The Court in Colegrove took a bright line approach in defining the respective role for the legislative and judicial departments stating, "It is hostile to a
democratic system to involve the judiciary in the politics of the people."73 The
fact that the petitioners presented a strong argument "that the conditions of
' did not
which they complain are grave evils and offend public morality,"74
alter the Court's strict position in favor of preserving the separation of powers.75 "The short of it," explained the Court, "is that the Constitution has con76
ferred upon Congress exclusive authority to secure fair representation ....,
So what happens if Congress declines to take legislative measures to accomplish this reapportionment? The Court answered this question as follows: "If
Congress failed in exercising its powers, whereby standards of fairness are
offended, the remedy ultimately lies with the people. 77
Baker v. Carr," another reapportionment case, decided sixteen years after
Colegrove, did not weaken the strict adherence by the Court to the structural
and functional division of governmental powers. Distinguishing Colegrove, a
case involving congressional districts, the Court in Baker noted that "[w]e have
no question decided, or to be decided, by a political branch of government
coequal with this Court."79' Though reluctant to tread into the exclusive area of
Congress, the Court in Baker willingly extended its judicial power over the

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id. at 675 (citing Sherman v. Story, 30 Cal. 253, 275 (1866)).
328 U.S. 549 (1946).
Id. at 552.
Id. at 553-54.
Id. at 554.
See id.
Id.
Id.
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
Id. at 226.
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269

Tennessee legislature, determined by the Court not to be a coequal branch of
government."0

Still, the Court continues to recognize the constitutional precepts that divide the power of governing into three branches -

the Legislative, Executive

and Judicial. The Court also acknowledges that the judiciary cannot possibly
fashion a remedy for every wrong that might occur to some person or group of
people.8 ' One of the classic cases on this issue is Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State
82
Board of Equalization of Colorado,
decided by the Supreme Court in 1915.
In Bi-Metallic, the Court offered the following guideline: "Where a rule of

conduct applies to more than a few people it is impracticable that every one
should have a direct voice in its adoption."83 A legislature has the constitution-

al power to enact laws "that affect the person or property of individuals, sometime to the point of ruin, without giving them a chance to be heard."84 In such
cases, the rights of people affected by such legislative action "are protected in
the only way that they can be in a complex society, by their power, immediate
or remote, over those who make the rule."85
However, in Missouri v. Jenkins,86 the Court was willing to permit the
judiciary to enter the realm of taxation," ordinarily considered a subject belonging exclusively to Congress - the branch that is dependent on the people.
It is not insignificant that the framers of the Constitution required that "[a]ll
Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives." 8

80. See id. But then two years later, the Court extended Baker to the reapportionment of Congressional
Districts in Westberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964). In reaching this decision, the Court relied heavily upon
THE FEDERALIST essays by Madison. See Westberry, 376 U.S. at 7-18. Justice Harlan, in a strong dissenting
opinion, stated, "I had not expected to witness the day when the Supreme Court of the United States would
render a decision which casts grave doubt on the constitutionality of the composition of the House of Representatives. It is not an exaggeration to say that such is the effect of today's decision." Id. at 20 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). Since Baker, the Supreme Court has freely expanded its judicial arm around both Congress and
the state legislatures. See Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486
(1969); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). The latest reapportionment cases indicate that the Court is in firm control of what at one time was considered a political question.
See Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995); United States Dept. of
Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442 (1992).
81. In Lewis v. Casey, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 2179 (1996), the Court reiterated the constitutional principal that
"that prevents courts of law from undertaking tasks assigned to the political branches." Considering a claim
filed by twenty-two prison inmates that the State prison was depriving them of their rights of access to the
courts and counsel, the Court stated, "[I]t is not the role of courts, but that of the political branches, to shape
the institutions of government in such fashion as to comply with the laws and the Constitution." Id. In the
setting of prisons, the Court added, "[I]t is for the political branches of the State and Federal Governments to
manage prisons in such fashion that official interference with the presentation of claims will not occur." Id.
See also Nixon v. U.S., 113 S.Ct. 732 (1993). In INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983), the Court stated,
"The Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers of the new Federal Government into three defined
categories, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial, to assure, as nearly as possible, that each branch of government would confine itself to its assigned responsibility." But see also U.S. v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385
(1990); Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society, 478 U.S. 221 (1986).
82. 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
83. Id. at 445.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. 495 U.S. 33 (1990).
87. See id. at 55.
88. U. S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl.1. In U.S. v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 397-98 (1990), the Court
explained that the Origination Clause is limited to "a statute that raises revenue to support Government gener-
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"[I]mposing Taxes on us without our Consent" was one of the grievances listed
against the King of Great Britain that led to the historic Declaration of Independence. 9 Under the new government by and for the People of the United
States, the Framers believed this grievance would never again occur. Requiring
that all revenue measures originate in the House of Representatives, the drafters
of the Constitution sought to insure that there would never again be an
unconsented tax on the people. In the context of the republican form of government, the People give their consent through their representatives elected to
the House.
This left the question of whether the Court's decision in Missouri v.
Jenkins ran counter to the Constitutional history and to the drafters' structural
division of powers? Four members of the Court' thought it might. Justice
Kennedy in a concurring opinion stated that the description of judicial power
incorporated in Article III does not include "the word 'tax' or anything that resembles it."'" A judicial claim to the power of taxation without consent would
resurrect the same grievance that the people filed against the King of Great
Britain. Clearly, the Framers had no understanding that taxation would ever be
considered "a proper area for judicial involvement."' In The FederalistNo.
78, Alexander Hamilton compared the respective power of the legislative
branch to the judicial branch:
The executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the
community. The legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes
the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary on the contrary has no influence over either the sword
or the purse, no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the
society, and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said
to have neither Force nor Will, but merely judgment; and must ultimately
depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its
judgments. 3
Considering the exclusive legislative power assigned to Congress in the
context of the constitutional framers' conscious choice of a republican form of

ally." See also Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196, 202 (1897).
89. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 19 (U.S. 1776). The unanimous Declaration of Independence of the thirteen United States of America was adopted on July 4, 1776.
90. Justice Kennedy wrote a concurrence and was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor
and Justice Scalia. See Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 58.
91. Id. at 65 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
92. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
93. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 522-23 (Alexander Hamilton) (Cooke ed., 1961). A portion of this passage was quoted in Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Jenkins. See Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 65 (Kennedy,
J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter, in his dissenting opinion in Baker, also drew on the wisdom expressed by
Hamilton. He wrote:
Disregard of inherent limits in the effective exercise of the Court's "judicial Power" not only presages the futility of judicial intervention in the essentially political conflict of forces by which the relation between population and representation has time out of mind been and now is determined. It may
well impair the Court's position as the ultimate organ of "the supreme Law of the Land".... The
Court's authority - possessed of neither the purse nor the sword - ultimately rests on sustained
public confidence in its moral sanction. Such feeling must be nourished by the Court's complete
detachment, in fact and in appearance, from political entanglements ....
Baker v. Can, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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government, it becomes somewhat more critical when Congress delegates that
power to an administrative agency, beyond the immediate political reach of the
people. Yet how could government otherwise protect the people? Delegation of
legislative authority grew out of a clear necessity of government, particularly
with the establishment of a national character for corporations as legal entities.94 In the late 1800s, the farmers, workers and other people came under the
tight domination of the national corporation.
Justice John Marshall Harlan, in a concurring and dissenting opinion filed
in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States," described the conditions
in the business world in 1890 that alerted Congress of the need for strong legislation to check growing monopolistic practices.' Dissenting to the Court's
"rule of reason" interpretation of the Sherman Antitrust Act,97 Justice Harlan
wrote:
All who recall the condition of the country in 1890 will remember that
there was everywhere, among the people generally, a deep feeling of
unrest. The Nation had been rid of human slavery... but the conviction
was universal that the country was in real danger from another kind of
slavery sought to be fastened on the American people, namely, the slavery
that would result from aggregations of capital in the hands of a few individuals and corporations controlling, for their own profit and advantage
exclusively, the entire business of the country .... ."
Such danger from the great aggregations of capital, explained Justice Harlan,
had to "be met firmly and by such statutory regulations as would adequately
protect the people against oppression and wrong."" Congress had already responded with the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887"° and the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890.11 Senator James Z. George of Mississippi, though questioning the authority of Congress to adopt such strong economic legislation as that
offered by the Sherman Act, still recognized the terrible need for regulating the
growing power of national corporations. 2 Taking the floor of Congress, Senator George remarked:

94. See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839).
95. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
96. See id. at 82-105 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting). Though the Court found Standard Oil to be
a monopoly, the Court established the "rule of reason," which led Justice Harlan to dissent. See id.
97. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-36 (1994)).
98. StandardOil, 221 U.S. at 83 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
99. Id. at 84 (Harlan, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
100. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (repealed 1995). The Interstate Commerce Commission created by Congress in 1887, was given "authority to inquire into management of the
business of all common carriers subject to the provisions of [the] act," and was mandated to "keep itself informed as to the manner and method in which the same is conducted." Id. at 383. Then after operating with
expanding power for almost one hundred and ten years, the Interstate Commerce Commission was abolished
by Congress. The Interstate Commerce Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 804 (1995),
simply read: "The Interstate Commerce Commission is abolished."
101. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-36 (1994)).
102. 21 CONG. REC. 2598 (1890) (remarks of Senator George).
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Certainly there is no subject likely to engage the attention of the present
Congress in which the people of this country are more deeply interested
than in the subject of trusts and combinations. These evils have grown
within the last few years to an enormous magnitude; enormous also in
their numbers. They cover nearly all the great branches of trade and of
production in which our country is interested. They grow out of the present tendency of economic affairs throughout the world. It is a sad thought
to the philanthropist that the present system of production and of exchange is having that tendency which is sure at some not very distant day
to crush out all small men, all small capitalists, all small enterprises. This
is being done now. We find everywhere over our land the wrecks of small
independent enterprises thrown in our pathway. °3
This federal legislation came only after it had become apparent that the
individual states lacked the power and authority to regulate the growing interstate giants. In Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. v.Illinois,"4 decided in 1886,
the Court struck down an Illinois statute intended to prevent unjust discrimination in freight rates by railroads." One year later, Congress responded with a
relatively timid effort to regulate the railroads through power delegated to the
Interstate Commerce Commission." Although weak in terms of power, this
Congressional delegation of authority to the ICC was still a major step toward
the evolution of a government of administrative agencies. Then in 1914, Congress created a major and powerful agency, the Federal Trade Commission, in
response to the perceived uncertainty of antitrust enforcement policy created by
the Supreme Court's "rule of reason."'0 7 Justice Frankfurter, in his dissenting
opinion filed in FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Co.,"5 noted the enormity
of the power delegated to the Federal Trade Commission compared to an agency like the Interstate Commerce Commission."° He compared the two agencies to demonstrate the need for strict judicial review: "[T]he Interstate Commerce Act dealt with governmental regulation not only of a limited sector of the
economy but of economic enterprises that had long been singled out for public
control."" 0 Justice Frankfurter continued, "On the other hand, the Federal
Trade Commission Act gave an administrative agency authority over economic
controls of a different sort that began with the Sherman Law - restrictions
upon the whole domain of economic enterprise engaged in interstate com-

103. Id.
104. 118 U.S. 557 (1886).
105. See id. at 562. Until this decision by the Court, Congress had declined to take action against the
abuses of the railroads. See JOHN F. STOVER, AMERICAN RAILROADS 126 (1961).
106. See Justice Harlan's dissent in ICC v. Alabama MidlandRy. Co., 168 U.S. 144, 176-77 (1897).
107. See Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 203, 38 Stat. 717 (1914). In 1914, Congress was responding to the ineffectiveness of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, weakened by the Supreme
Court in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), and its companion case, United
States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106 (1911). In those cases, the Court used harsh language but at
the same time interpreted section 1 of the Sherman Act to prohibit only those restraints of trade considered by
the courts to be unreasonable. See 51 CONG. REC. 9873, 9876 (1914) (remarks of Mr. Murdock). See also 51
CONG. REC. 1866, 8840 (1914); 51 CONG. REC. 11,081, 11,237 (1914).
108. 344 U.S. 392 (1952).
109. See id. at 404 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
I10. Id. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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merce."''. Based on this comparison, Justice Frankfurter concluded that the
interpretation of Section 5 of the FTC Act, the prohibition of "unfair methods
of competition... was not entrusted to the Commission for ad hoc determination within the interstices of individual records but was left for ascertainment by
this Court.""'
Without doubt, "Itihe power granted [to the FTC] is far-reaching in its
results, and of a most salutary character.""' 3 Not surprisingly, with such an
accolade from the court, the power delegated to the Commission withstood the
nondelegation challenge. Ruling against the delegation challenge, the Court in
T.C. Hurst & Son v. FTC, stated that "it is manifestly within the power of Congress to legislate generally in respect to the burdens that may or may not be imposed upon foreign and interstate commerce."".4 In another FTC case, Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. FTC," the court linked the delegation of authority to the
Commission to a necessity of government. "With the increasing complexity of
human activities," explained the court, "many situations arise where governmental control can be secured only by the 'board' or 'commission' form of
legislation.""' 6 In Sears, the court acknowledged that the power delegated to
the Commission "may be deemed to be quasi legislative," however, the court
also explained, "it is so only in the sense that it converts the actual legislation
from a static into a dynamic condition. But the converter is not the electricity.',117

As long as Congress did not surrender the "electricity" itself, the court in
Sears manifested a willingness to allow the Commission to exercise "quasi
legislative" powers that had been delegated by Congress. Up until 1928, the
Supreme Court, in its review of the nondelegation issue, had verbalized the
constitutional constraints embedded in Article I, that all legislative power is
vested in a Congress. Yet, through the use of fiction, the Court allowed the
delegation to stand with the finding that the authority delegated was not in fact
"legislative" power."' In United States v. Grimaud,'' decided in 1911, the
Court recognized an element of government necessity when considering the
delegation issue. "In the nature of things," the Court stated, "it was impracticable for Congress to provide general regulations for these various and varying
details of management [and preservation of public forests]."'2 0 The govern111. Id. at 405 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
112. Id. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). As enacted in 1914, the prohibiting language in section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, read: "That unfair methods of competition in commerce are hereby declared
unlawful." Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, § 5, 38 Stat. at 719.
113. T. C. Hurst & Son v. FTC, 268 F. 874, 877 (E.D. Va. 1920).
114. Id. at 877.
115. 258 F. 307 (7th. Cir. 1919).
116. Id. at 312. See also National Harness Mfrs. Ass'n v. FTC, 268 F. 705, 707 (6th Cir. 1920).
117. Sears, 258 F. at 312.
118. See ICC v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U.S. 194, 214-15 (1912); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S.
506, 516 (1911); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 680-85 (1892); Cargo of Brig Aurora Bum Side v. United
States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813).
119. 220 U.S. 506 (1911).
120. Id. at 516. In Grimaud, the defendant was charged with the criminal act of grazing sheep on the
Sierra Forest Reserve in violation of the rules promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture. See id. at 509.
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ment had asked the Court to relax the "general theory of government that there
should be no union between the several departments" so that the government
could more efficiently protect its public lands.'2'
Justice Lamar, writing for the Court, agreed that the general theory of
separation of powers should not be so strictly followed.' Though he did acknowledge the difficulty in defining "the line which separates legislative power
to make laws, from administrative authority to make regulations."'2 Ultimately, the Court determined that the rule making authority delegated to the Secretary of Agriculture was not legislative power. Specifically, the Court held,
"Congress was merely conferring administrative functions upon an agent, and

not delegating to him legislative power."' 24 In Wayman v Southard," Chief
Justice Marshall acknowledged that the line separating the divisions of government had not "been exactly drawn."'' In fact, the framers of our Constitution
never intended that there be an absolute separation of powers.
C. No Absolute Separation

James Madison, in The FederalistNo. 47, made it clear: "On the slightest
view of the British constitution we must perceive, that the legislative, executive
and judiciary departments are by no means totally separate and distinct from
each other."'' So if not absolute, when is the constitutional structural division
of governmental powers violated? Madison addressed this question in The FederalistNo. 48. Madison wrote, "It was shewn in the last paper, that the political
apothegm there examined, does not require that the legislative, executive and
judiciary departments should be wholly unconnected with each other."'28 Certainly, "a mere demarkation on parchment of the constitutional limits of the
several departments," Madison cautioned, "is not a sufficient guard against
those encroachments which lead to a tyrannical concentration of all the powers
of government in the same hands."' 29

121. Id. at 512.
122. See id. at 517.
123. Id. The Court stated, "This difficulty has often been recognized ....
Id. In Wayman v. Southard,
23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) I, 42-43 (1825), relied upon by the Court in Grimaud, Chief Justice Marshall, considering Congressional authority delegated to the courts to make rules, stated, "It will not be contended that
Congress can delegate to the Courts, or to any other tribunals, powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative." However, the Chief Justice upheld the validity of the delegation, stating, "Congress may certainly
delegate to others, powers which the legislature may rightfully exercise itself." Id. at 43. See also Union
Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364, 378-88 (1907).
124. Grimaud, 220 U.S. at 516.
125. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825).
126. Id. at 43.
127. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 325 (James Madison) (Cooke ed., 1961). See also DIETzE, supra note
32, at 127; EPSTEIN, supra note 32, at 130; Sharp, supra note 24, at 407.
128. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 332 (James Madison) (Cooke ed., 1961).
129. Id. at 338. Professor Malcolm Sharp wrote: "Madison .. . observed that a paper separation, such as
had been relied on by some of the states, was useless. This amounted to no more than putting faith in the
faithless legislature." Sharp, supra note 24, at 409. Madison wrote:
As the legislative department alone has access to the pockets of the people, and has in some Constitutions full discretion, and in all, a prevailing influence over the pecuniary rewards of those who fill
the other departments, a dependence is thus created in the latter. which gives still greater facility to
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Then in 1928, the Supreme Court took what it referred to, in J.W.
Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States,3 as a "common sense" approach to the
delegation issue.' Specifically, the Court stated, "If Congress were to be required to fix every rate, it would be impossible to exercise the power at all.
Therefore, common sense requires that in the fixing of such rates, Congress
may provide a Commission... to fix those rates.. . ."" The Court then established the delegation principle that "[i]f Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to fix
such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden
delegation of legislative power."'33
Hampton set the stage for a more aggressive move by Congress to create
in reality a new and higher realm administered by administrative agencies. As
expected, Congress quickly accepted the judicial license to delegate a greater
and more diverse authority to the President and to newly created administrative
agencies. Government necessity reached new heights as Congress sought ways
to help pull the country from the grips of the great depression. In 1930, Congress established the Federal Power Commission. 34 Three years later, Congress enacted the National Industrial Recovery Act, 3 ' and created the Securities Exchange Commission, 36 and the Federal Communications Commission.'37 Then in 1938, Congress enacted the Civil Aeronautics Act. 3 '
Of all these enactments, it was the National Industrial Recovery Act that
provided the major impetus in what configuration administrative procedure and
judicial review would take. The preamble to that Act read: "To encourage national industrial recovery, to foster fair competition, and to provide for the
construction of certain useful public works.' ' 139 Title I of the Act began with a
Congressional declaration of a "national emergency productive of widespread
unemployment and disorganization of industry, which. . . undermines the standard of living of the American people."'" Addressing this national emergency, Congress delegated to the President authority to approve "a code or codes
of fair competition" drafted and presented to him by private "trade or industrial

encroachments of the former.
THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 334 (James Madison) (Cooke ed., 1961).
130. 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
131. See id. at 407.
132. Id. at 407-08.
133. Id. at 409. See also ICC v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U.S. 194, 214 (1912).
134. See Pub. L. No. 412, 46 Stat. 797 (1930). Congress extended the scope of authority for the act by
adding electricity in the Federal Water Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 333, 49 Stat. 838 (1935), and natural gas in
Pub. L. No. 688, 52 Stat 821 (1938).
135. Pub. L. No. 67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
136. Pub. L. No. 291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934).
137. Pub. L. No. 416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934).
138. Pub. L. No. 706, 52 Stat. 973 (1938).
139. 48 Stat. at 195.
140. Id.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1996

17

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 32 [1996], Iss. 2, Art. 4

TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 32:259

organization, associations, or groups."'' 1 Additionally, Congress authorized the
President
to prohibit the transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum and the products thereof produced or withdrawn from storage in
excess of the amount permitted to be produced or withdrawn from storage
by any State law or valid regulation or order prescribed thereunder, by
any board, commission, officer, or other duly authorized agency of a
State. 4
Considering the petroleum industry's economic problems which had national consequences, it was not surprising that Congress intended to delegate
broad powers to the President. With the East Texas oil field commanding so
much attention, such expansive delegation might easily be defended on the
ground of governmental necessity. It all started with the Daisy Bradford Three
gusher that opened the East Texas oil field. 43 By the end of May 1931, the
oil market had become turbulently depressed from the uncontrolled production
that sent the price of crude oil spiraling downward to a low of six cents a barrel.'" Violence and economic waste marked the need for drastic action. 4
On August 16, 1931, Ross S. Sterling, Governor of the State of Texas, issued a
proclamation, declaring "'a state of insurrection, tumult, riot, and a breach of
the peace.""' Governor Sterling then declared martial law and ordered Jacob
F. Wolters, brigadier general of the Texas National Guard, to take control of the
oil fields and to enforce Sterling's executive order drastically limiting the level
of production. 47
But on October 13, 1931, the district court had issued a temporary order
restraining the Governor from enforcing his seizure of the oil field.' 4 Attracting national attention, Congress addressed this same problem in section 9 of the
National Industrial Recovery Act. But then, in Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan, 149 the Supreme Court invalidated this Congressional effort to solve the
problems stemming from inadequately controlled oil production. Section 9 of
the NIRA was held to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers.' One needs to look at section 9 of the NIRA in terms of the total lack of
procedural protection for oil men caught in the vice of transporting across state

141. Id. § 3(a), 48 Stat. at 196. In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935),
the Court struck down this portion of the NIRA as being an unlawful delegation of legislative powers.
142. National Industrial Recovery Act, § 9(c), 48 Stat. at 200.
143. See Kent Biffle, Boom Turned E. Texas Into a Free-For-All,THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 9,
1990, at 43A.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 387 (1932).
147. See id.
148. See id. at 387-88. On December 12, 1932, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower
court that the seizure of the East Texas oil field was unconstitutional. Id. For another related case dealing with
the East Texas oil field, see United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (an antitrust case
that arose after the independent oil companies got together and worked out the problems that caused the depressed oil market caused by over production).
149. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
150. See id. at 430.
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lines the overproduction of crude oil from the East Texas oil field and other
major producing areas. Such conduct, it must be remembered, had not been
made illegal by Congress.
Whether the act of transporting in interstate commerce of this "hot oil"
was to be made a criminal act, was a decision delegated by Congress solely to
the President. Under the Act, the President was authorized to prohibit the transportation of this "hot oil" in interstate commerce.' On July 11, 1933, under
authority delegated to him by Congress, President Franklin Roosevelt signed an
Executive Order prohibiting the transportation of "hot oil" in interstate commerce.'52 An executive decision was issued without any notice or participation
by the persons affected. In October 1933, Panama Refining Company, owner of
a refining plant in Texas, challenged the constitutionality of Section 9 of the
NIRA on the ground that Congress had unlawfully delegated legislative power
to the President. The Supreme Court agreed. In Panama Refining, the Court
held section 9 of the Act unconstitutional:
If § 9(c) were held valid, it would be idle to pretend that anything
would be left of limitations upon the power of the Congress to delegate
its law-making function .... Instead of performing its law-making function, the Congress could at will and as to such subjects as it chooses
transfer that function to the President or other officer or to an administrative body.s
What the Court was saying in Panama Refining was even more clearly
brought out in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States.'54 This was
the second case in which the Court invalidated a portion of the National Industrial Recovery Act under the nondelegation doctrine."'
Schechter involved section 3(a) of the Act which in effect delegated broad
authority to private trade or industrial associations or groups. Section 3 authorized the President, upon the application of private trade associations, to approve "a code or codes of fair competition for the trade or industry."' 56 Considered collectively, the numerous "codes of fair competition" put into effect
after the NIRA went into effect substantially altered the private economic sector
from one of free competition to a managed economy. Section 3(a) of the Act
authorized private industrial associations to draft codes of fair competition
which, after their approval, legally controlled all members of the particular

151. See id. at 406-07.
152. See id. Roosevelt's order prohibiting the transportation of the "hot oil" was Executive Order 6199,
issued on July 11, 1933. This was then followed by Executive Order 6204, issued on July 14, delegating to
the Secretary of Interior all powers vested in the President to enforce the prohibition.
153. Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 430.
154. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
155. See supra note 141.
156. See National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 67, § 3(a), 48 Stat 195, 196 (1933).
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industry groups.'57 Of course, the private codes did not legally go into effect,
unless and until the President gave his approval.' 58
What level of review the President actually gave to the codes of fair competition is not known and is beyond the scope of this article. Yet, a review of
the CongressionalInformation Service Index to PresidentialExecutive Orders
& Proclamationsyields some idea of the expanse of the private regulations imposed on the economy.'59 During the six-month period after the NIRA went
into effect, hundreds of Presidential executive orders were issued on various
codes of fair competition presented for approval. A general scrutiny of the CIS
Index offers a glimpse of the nature and composition of the U.S. economy in
1933. The first ten entries of the fair competition executive orders offers a
reminder of the early presence in this country of textiles: Silk Association of
America, Cotton Thread Industry, Textile finishing industry, Underwear and
allied products industry, Silk and rayon dyeing and printing industry, Ship
building and ship repairing industry, Wool textile industry, Hosiery Manufactures, Association of Garment Manufactures, and National Council of Pajama
Manufactures."
Even before the Supreme Court decided the Panama Refining and
Schechter cases, the Congress had under consideration H.R. 6323, an act "to
provide for the custody of Federal proclamations, orders, regulations, notices,
and other documents, and for the prompt and uniform printing and distribution
thereof.' 6 1 Congress was quite aware of the procedural deficiency in this new
and exploding area of administrative law. During debates on this Federal Register proposal, Congressman Emanuel Celler made this observation:
In the first 15 months after March 4, 1933, the President alone issued 674
Executive orders, aggregating approximately 1,400 pages. This was a
greater volume than that of the preceding 4 years, and nearly six times as
great as that for the 39 years from 1862 through 1900. Moreover, in the
first year of the National Recovery Administration 2,998 administrative
orders were issued. 62

157. See id. Section 3(b) of the NIRA provides: "After the President shall have approved any such code,
the provisions of such code shall be the standards of fair competition for such trade or industry or subdivision
thereof." Provisions of the codes were enforceable in federal courts. Section 3(c) read: "The several district
courts of the United States are hereby invested with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of any code
of fair competition approved under this title .... Id.
158. See id. That in this approval process, Section 3(a) includes this provision: "That where such code or
codes affect the services and welfare of persons engaged in other steps of the economic process, nothing in
this section shall deprive such persons of the right to be heard prior to approval by the President of such code
or codes." Id. It is not known and it is beyond the scope of this paper to what extent there were such hearings
prior to the President's approval.
159. See CIS INDEX To PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE ORDERS & PROCLAMATIONS, PART II: MAR. 4, 1921

TO DEC. 31, 1983, WARREN HARDING TO RONALD REAGAN 113-33 (1986).
160. See id. at 113-16. A sampling of the industries filing codes of fair competition during the first six
months of the law provides a nostalgic journey through history. To name a few: saddlery manufacturing industry, umbrella manufacturing industry, handkerchief industry, lace curtain industry, soap and glycerine
industry, ladder manufacturing, wood plug industry, and the mop stick industry. The list suggests a noticeable
absence of the big conglomerates that we have today.
161. 79 CONG. REC. 2807 (1935).
162. 79 CONG. REc. 4788 (1935) (remarks of Cong. Celler). These statistics recited by Congressman
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Congress was apparently influenced by Professor Erwin N. Griswold, of
the Harvard Law School, who in 1934 wrote:
Administrative regulations "equivalent to law" have become important
elements in the ordering of our lives today.... [T]he volume of these
rulings has so increased that full, accurate, and prompt information of
administrative activity is now quite as important to the citizen and to his
legal advisor as is knowledge of the product of the Congressional
mill.6

Professor Griswold drew upon the procedure followed with respect to the publication of statutes in recommending a similar procedure for the publication of
administrative rules and orders. He noted, "Congressional enactments are readily available to the profession... [through] the Statutes at Large.. .. "
Griswold suggested a solution that he considered "amazingly simple."'6
On July 22, 1935, Congress adopted Professor Griswold's suggestion by sending H.R. 6323 to the President."6 Four days later, on July 26, 1935, the President approved and signed the bill. Now, just two months after Schechter Poultry was handed down by the Supreme Court, the Federal Register Act, the first
step in opening the business of agencies to greater public light, was in
place. 67 Shortly thereafter, Congress began working on a more comprehensive
measure to control the growth and power of administrative agencies to "provide
for the more expeditious settlement of disputes with the United States, and for
other purposes."' 68
This measure was the highly controversial Walter-Logan bill, named for its
sponsors, Senator M. M. Logan of Kentucky, and Representative Francis E.
Walter of Easton, Pennsylvania. Supported by the American Bar Association,
the measure would, some believed, incapacitate the administrative process that
had taken such a surge during the 1930s.69 Representative Adolph J. Sabath
of Chicago was one of the vocal opponents of the proposition. Attempting to
hasten the debate and to silence Sabath, Representative E. E. Cox of Georgia
inquired, "Has the gentleman completed his statement in ,opposition to the
Celler were drawn directly from Erwin N. Griswold, Government In Ignorance of The Law - A Plea For
Better Publication of Executive Legislation, 48 HARV. L. REV. 198, 198-99 (1934).
163. Griswold, supra note 162, at 198.
164. Id. at 203.
165. Id. at 205.
166. See 79 CONG. REc. 11,607 (1935).
167. See Federal Register Act, Pub. L. No. 74, 49 Stat. 500 (1935). For a discussion of the Federal Register Act, see Urban A. Lavery, "The FederalRegister" - Official PublicationForAdministrative Regulations,
Etc., 7 F.R.D. 625 (1947). See also John H. Wigmore, The FederalRegister and Code of Federal Regulations, 29 A.B.A. J. 10 (1943); David C. Eberhart, Jr., Note, Federal Register Documents: Effective Dates and
Constructive Notice Before and After The Administrative ProceduresAct, 35 GEO. L.J. 354 (1947).
168. 86 CONG. REc. 4738 (1940). For a discussion of the Walter-Logan bill, see Marshall J. Breger, Administrative Law After Forty Years, 33 FED. B. NEws & J. 297 (1986); Walter Gellhom, The Administrative
ProcedureAct: The Beginnings, 72 VA. L. REV. 219, 226 (1986); James M. Landis, Crucial Issues In Administrative Law, 53 HARv. L. REV. 1077 (1940); Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative
Procedure,78 COLtJM. L. REV. 258, 271 (1978). See also President Franklin D. Roosevelt's veto message, 86
CONG. REC. 13942 (1940), reprinted in 27 A.B.A. J. 52 (1941).
169. See Verkuil, supra note 168, at 272.
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amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois? If he has, let us vote.' ' 70
Sabath responded, "I will let the gentleman from Georgia know when I am
ready to conclude."''
He then addressed the bill's sponsor, by stating, "Knowing the gentleman
from Pennsylvania [Mr. Walter] as I do, I fear that he has been imposed upon
by the proponents of this bill, the gentlemen of the American Bar Association."'72 As part of his remarks in opposition to the Walter-Logan bill, Congressman Sabath inserted into the record the Brookings Institute report, opposing the legislation, in its entirety. "3 The bill placed the courts, specifically the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, squarely in the center of the
administrative process with few limitations. Professor Verkuil observed, "The
bill provided for judicial review that was particularly intrusive into the administrative process."'74 On this point, the Brookings Institute report read:
The ultimate consequence [of this bill] would be not only to swamp the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and the circuit courts of
appeals with a flood of minor administrative matters that have never been
regarded as justifiable cases or controversies, but to retard and hamper the
work of the executive branch of the Government to an intolerable degree.
The control of the executive branch would be transferred to the courts,
and the performance of all executive duties "would be subjected to the
supervision and control of the judiciary. Theoretically, this is contrary to
the basic ideas of our form of government, 75which makes a clear demarcation between executive and judicial duties.
Still, with support from the American Bar, the bill passed. Then it was
vetoed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt on December 18, 1940. "I am convinced," the President said in his veto message to Congress, "that in reality the
effect of this bill would be to reverse and, to a large extent, cancel one of the
most significant and useful trends of the twentieth century in legal administration." 76 Of course, the "useful trends of the twentieth century" were, in a
large measure the creation of Roosevelt's New Deal policy, characterized by the
transfer of enormous blocks of power over to administrative agencies. The
Walter-Logan bill unduly challenged this New Deal social philosophy by increasing the role of the Court. Defending his program, Roosevelt continued his
veto message:
That movement [had] its origin in the recognition even by courts themselves that the conventional processes of the courts are not adapted to
handling controversies in the mass. Court procedure is adapted to the intensive investigation of individual controversies. But it is impossible to

170. 86 CONG. REc. 4738 (1940) (remarks of E. E. Cox).
171. 86 CONG. REC. 4738 (1940) (remarks of Adolph J. Sabath).
172. Id.
173. See 86 CONG. REC. 4738-40 (1940). The Brooking's report concluded: "It is urged, in view of all the
foregoing considerations, that the legislation should not be enacted." Id.
174. Verkuil, supra note 168, at 271.
175. 86 CONG. REC. 4740 (1940).
176. Id. at 13,942.
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subject the daily routine of fact-finding in many of our agencies to court
procedure.

7

The Walter-Logan debate had involved the critical question of the appropriate level of judicial involvement in the administrative process. In a report
accompanying Roosevelt's veto message, Attorney General Robert H. Jackson,
explained this level of judicial involvement. He wrote:
The bill provides that any party to an administrative proceeding who is
aggrieved by the final decision of the agency may secure review in a
circuit court of appeals or the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Already under existing statutes specific decisions affecting the rights
of individuals are made subject to judicial review. This act, however, does
not confine review to the specific matters heretofore allowed but sweeps
into the judicial hopper all manner of questions which have never before
been considered appropriate for judicial review.
For example, such matters as the awarding of contracts, the acceptance or rejection of supplies, the granting or withholding of compensation or hospitalization from a veteran, fraud orders of the Post Office Department, the granting or withholding of a license for a vessel or of a
master's or mate's ticket, the determination of claims for benefits under
the Social Security Act are a few examples, taken at random, of governmental actions of an executive or administrative nature which may become subject to judicial review were this bill to become law, but which
have never been regarded as so reviewable. The ultimate consequences
would be not only to swamp the courts with a flood of minor administrative matters but to retard and hamper the work of the executive branch of
the Government. The discretion which must be exercised in performance
of executive duties would, to a considerable extent, be transferred to the
courts. 7 8

Roosevelt agreed with his Attorney General. In concluding his veto message to Congress, President Roosevelt expressed concern for the consequences
of the proposed increased judicial scrutiny of administrative agencies. He further wrote:
I am convinced that it would produce the utmost chaos and paralysis in
the administration of the Government at this critical time. I am convinced
that it is an invitation to endless and innumerable controversies at a moment when we can least afford to spend either governmental or private
effort in the luxury of
litigation ....
179

without my approval.

For these reasons I return the bill

Roscoe Pound severely criticized President Roosevelt's Walter-Logan veto
message to Congress. "This message," Pound told the Judicial Section of the
New York State Bar Association
is so thoroughly in keeping with the Marxian idea of the disappearance of
law, now much in fashion, and so much in the spirit of the absolute ideas

177. Id.
178. Id. at 13,945.
179. Id. at 13,943.
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which have been making headway all over the world in the past two decades, that it deserves to be made the text for a discussion of the place of
the judiciary in our democracy."
Walter Gellhorn could not understand the temper of Pound's criticism of
Roosevelt's message to Congress. To this effect he wrote, "After reading this
characterization of the veto message... [and] re-read[ing] the message twice,
[I] ...failed to identify what had set the alarm bells ringing in Dean Pound's
8
mind."' '
Forgotten during the Walter-Logan debate was the role that judicial review
played in the evolution of the "intelligible principle" of delegation enunciated
by the Supreme Court in the Hampton case.' In fact, it may have been the
very presence of a protective level of judicial review, supplanting thereby the
constitutionally structured political safety that the people had against legislative
abuse, that served as the back-drop to the evolving justification for allowing
vast measures of power to be transferred by Congress into the hands of administrative agencies. For example, in upholding the powers delegated to the Federal Trade Commission, the Sixth Circuit, in National Harness Mfrs.' Ass'n v.
" observed that "[t]he commission's determination of these questions
FTC,'83
[unfair methods of competition] is not final."' 84 The court stated:
Not only does the statute give a right of review thereon, upon application
by an aggrieved trader, to a Circuit Court of Appeals of the United States,
but the commission's order is not enforceable by the commission, but
only by order of court. "It is for the courts, not the commission, ultimately to determine as matter of law" what the words "unfair methods of
competition" include.' 85
In National Harness, the Sixth Circuit stressed the fact that "[t]hroughout
the proceedings, not only before the commission, but before the court, the trader is given the right and opportunity to be heard. The act delegates to the commission no judicial powers, nor does it, in our opinion, confer invalid executive
or administrative authority."' 86 Even clearer perhaps was the court in T.C.
Hurst & Son v. FTC, upholding the broad powers delegated to the Commission.
In Hurst the court observed:
The commission is given full power and authority to investigate, make
finding of fact, and render its judgment and order in relation thereto, and
before the same is carried into effect, the judgment of the Circuit Court of
Appeals, the second highest court under the government, is to be sought
by the commission, to enforce its order, and any party required by such
order to cease and desist from using such method of competition may

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Roscoe Pound, The Place of the Judiciaryin a DemocraticPolity, 27 A.B.A. J. 133, 133 (1941).
Gellhorn, supra note 168, at 226 n.22.
See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
268 F. 705 (6th Cir. 1920).
Id. at 707.
Id. (quoting FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 427 (1920)).
Id.
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obtain a review of such order in the Circuit Court of Appeals, by filing its
written petition praying therefor.5 7
The Federal Trade Commission Act,18 passed by Congress in 1914, during the fictional phase of the nondelegation doctrine, offers the best example of
the linkage between judicial review and permissible delegation. In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, the Seventh Circuit first noted the "government necessity"
that underlies Congress' delegation of authority to an agency. Specifically, the
court held, "With the increasing complexity of human activities many situations
arise where governmental control can be secured only by the 'board' or
'commission' form of legislation."'89 Acknowledging that the power delegated
to the FTC, to decide what conduct is an "unfair method of competition," might
be considered "quasi legislative," the court, upholding the authority delegated,
stated, "And though the action of the commission... may be counted quasi
judicial on account of its form ...

it is not judicial, because a judicial determi-

nation is only that which is embodied in a judgment or decree of a court and
enforceable by execution or other writ of the court."'"
This vital linkage between delegation and judicial review has likewise been
recognized by the Supreme Court. First, in FTC v. Gratz,"" the Court noted

that the "words 'unfair method of competition' are not defined by the statute
and their exact meaning is in dispute."'92 But, "[i]t is for the courts, not the
commission, ultimately to determine as matter of law what they include."'93
Then, in FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co.,'94 the Court reaf-

firmed this constitutional role of the Court in stating, "The content of the prohibition of 'unfair methods of competition,' to be applied to widely diverse business practices, was not entrusted to the Commission for ad hoc determination
within the interstices of individualized records but was left for ascertainmentby
this Court."'""

As the Framers structured the Constitution, the Court was assigned a specific role. In The FederalistNo. 78, Alexander Hamilton described this function
of judicial review.
The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the
courts. A constitution is in fact, and must be, regarded by the judges as a
fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning as
well as96 the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative
body.

187. T. C. Hurst & Son v. FTC, 268 F. 874, 877 (E.D. Va. 1920) (emphasis added).
188. Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 203, § 5, 38 Stat. 717,719 (1914) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994)).
189. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 258 F. 307, 312 (7th Cir. 1919).

190. Id.
191. 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. at 427 (emphasis added).
Id.
344 U.S. 392 (1953).
Id. at 405 (emphasis added).
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 525 (Alexander Hamilton) (Cooke ed., 1961).
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Thus, Hamilton described the precursor to Marbury v. Madison in that "[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is .... This is of the very essence of judicial duty." 97
D. The Administrative ProcedureAct
Moreover, this fundamental constitutional principle of judicial review became firmly implanted in the 1946 Administrative Procedure Act. Section 10(e)
defined the role of the court within the administrative process, stating, "So far
as necessary to decision and where presented the reviewing court shall decide
all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions,
and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of any agency action." '98 This statutory language is quite in line with both The Federalist No.
78 and Marbury v. Madison.
Judicial review was made a critical part of this Administrative Procedure
Act. This precept was made clear in the House Report accompanying the measure. "Very rarely," the Report read
do statutes withhold judicial review. It has never been the policy of Congress to prevent the administration of its own statutes from being judicially confined to the scope of authority granted or to the objectives specified. Its policy could not be otherwise, for in such a case statutes would
in effect be blank checks drawn to the credit of some administrative officer or board."9
The role for the courts in the new Administrative Procedure Act was well
defined in both the House and Senate Committee Reports. With respect to
Congress' intent for "scope of judicial review," each report stated in identical
language: "Reviewing courts are required to decide all relevant questions of
law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of any agency action."' Further, the legislative explanation made it even clearer that the interpretation of statutory terms was strictly a
judicial function, stating, "This section provides that questions of law are for
courts rather than agencies to decide in the last analysis .... ""'
Within the expanding administrative state, the people are left with no
choice but to rely on the protection offered by a reviewing court. For with the
delegation of legislative power to administrative agencies, the peoples' political
protection against legislative abuse is made less effective. Thus, we see the
Court continuing to tie delegation to judicial review. In Yakus v. United
States,' the Court again upheld the constitutional authority of Congress to

197. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).
198. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, § 10(e), 60 Stat. 237, 243 (1946) (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. § 706 (1994)).
199. H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong. 41 (1946).
200. Id. at 44. See also S. REP. NO. 752, 79th Cong. 27 (1945).
201. H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong. at 44. See also S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong. at 28.
202. 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
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delegate authority to an administrative agency.2" 3 The Court in Yakus specifically held, "Congress is not confined to that method of executing its policy
which involves the least possible delegation of discretion to administrative officers."'
This delegation will be upheld by the Court as long as there are
"standards... sufficiently definite and precise to enable Congress, the courts
and the public to ascertain whether the Administrator... has conformed to
2 5"
those standards."
Again, the Court links its affirmance of the delegation of authority from
Congress to the process of judicial review. Judge Leventhal, in a concurring
opinion filed in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA,2' explained the trade-off as follows:
"Congress has been willing to delegate its legislative powers broadly - and
courts have upheld such delegation - because there is court review to assure
that the agency exercises the delegated power within statutory limits, and that it
fleshes out objectives within those limits by an administration that is not irrational or discriminatory."2 7 Under this trade-off, our security against abusive
governmental authority essentially must come from the judiciary instead of the
political process, upon which the legislative branch is dependent.
It is in this context that we have witnessed an apparent endless proliferation of administrative bodies that in different degrees exercise power over various aspects of life, all in the name of governmental necessity. Additionally, we
have seen a growing acceptance of an observable increase in the level of deference given to these "independent" administrative bodies. An example of this is
found in Vermont Yankee, in which the Supreme Court repelled efforts of the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to impose additional procedural
requirements on the Atomic Energy Commission's rulemaking authority.0 8 In
an effort to protect the environmental interest involved, the Court of Appeals
had ordered the agency to satisfy a procedural requirement greater than that
required by the Administrative Procedure Act. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
concluded, the Court of Appeals had made a "serious departure from the very
basic tenet of administrative law that agencies should be free to fashion their
own rules of procedure." 2"

203. See id. at 425-26. See also Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 778-83 (1948).
204. Yakus, 321 U.S. at 425-26.
205. Id. at 426 (emphasis added).
206. 541 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1976).
207. Id. at 68 (Leventhal, J.,
concurring) (footnote omitted).
208. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S.
519, 544-49 (1978).
209. Id. at 544 (citing FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 423 U.S. 326 (1976)). In Transcontinental, the Court stated:
At least in the absence of substantial justification for doing otherwise, a reviewing court may not,
after determining that additional evidence is requisite for adequate review, proceed by dictating to the
agency the methods, procedures, and time dimension of the needed inquiry and ordering the results to
be reported to the court without opportunity for further consideration on the basis of the new evidence by the agency. Such a procedure clearly runs the risk of "propel[ling] the court into the domain
which Congress has set aside exclusively for the administrative agency.
Transcontinental,423 U.S. at 333 (citation omitted). See also Heckler v. Lopez, 463 U.S. 1328, 1332-33
(1983); Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980).
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For more than five decades, the Supreme Court has "emphasized that the
formulation of procedures was basically to be left within the discretion of the
agencies to which Congress had confided the responsibility for substantive
judgments."2 ' In FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co.,2 " reaffirmed in FCC
v. Schreiber,"2 the Court said that "administrative agencies ... should be free
to fashion their own rules of procedure and to pursue methods of inquiry capable of permitting them to discharge their multitudinous duties."2 3 Though federal agencies have been given wide discretion in determining the level of procedure they will follow, the Supreme Court has kept a slight opening in the window of judicial inquiry. In Vermont Yankee, the Court created an important
pressure valve, with this reservation: "Absent constitutional constraints or extremely compelling circumstances the 'administrative agencies should be free to
fashion their own rules of procedure .... """
Perhaps the most discerning statement of agency procedural discretion in
their adoption of new policy is found in SEC v. Chenery Corp.2"' Agencies
were given "the choice ... between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation."2 6 This choice, the Court explained, "is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency. ' However,
this discretion is not without limits.
In Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
noted that with all grants of discretion, "'there may be situations where the
[agency's] reliance on adjudication would amount to an abuse of discretion.""'2 9 What we seem to be left with is this: Subject of course to constitutional due process, administrative agencies are bound to follow the procedural
model established by Congress in the enabling act and in the Administrative
Procedure Act. Beyond this model, the agencies have discretion to impose a
higher, though not lower, level of procedure.
However, it is one thing to allow an agency to exercise such discretion in
formulating procedure. It is yet another thing for the administrative unit to be
given almost unbounded discretion in the interpretation of the very statutory
terms which Congress used in creating and in defining the agency's delegated
authority. It is with this interpretative discretion that brings us squarely to the
Chevron doctrine. This Chevron doctrine of judicial deference to agency inter-

210. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 524.
211. 309 U.S. 134 (1941).
212. 381 U.S. 279 (1965).
213. Pottsville,309 U.S. at 143.
214. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 543 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). See also Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. EPA, 35 F.3d 600, 606-07 (1st Cir. 1994); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 303 (1981). In Puerto Rico Aqueduct, the First Circuit stated, "It is well established that agencies are free to announce and develop rules in an adjudicatory setting .... Of course, there
are limits on this freedom." Puerto Rico Aqueduct, 35 F.3d at 607.
215. 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
216. Id. at 203.
217. Id.
218. 673 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1981).
219. Id. at 1009 (quoting NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974)).
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pretation of statutory terms has certainly, since 1984, commanded the immense
attention of the entire legal community - lawyers, judges and academicians. In
reviewing this doctrine, we might just find that the interpretations given to the
underlying decision are far more expansive than the decision itself.
III. CHEVRON U.S.A. INC. V. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE CouNCmI20°

Decided on June 25, 1984, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., arose out of a dispute over the Environmental Protection
Agency's definition of a statutory term in the Clean Air Act, as applied to
"nonattainment" states. The question for the Court was "whether [the] EPA's
decision to allow States to treat all of the pollution-emitting devices within the
same industrial grouping as though they were encased within a single 'bubble'
is based on a reasonable construction of the statutory term 'stationary
source." ' ' 'z This question was answered in the negative by the Court of Appeals based on established precedent.222
Judge Ginsburg, writing for a three judge panel, wrote that the Clean Air
Act "does not explicitly define what Congress envisioned as a 'stationary
source' to which the permit process and construction moratorium should apply."' Further, the court observed "[n]or is the issue squarely addressed in
the legislative history."" 4 This part of the Circuit Court opinion was accepted
by the Supreme Court, against NRDC's arguments that the term "stationary
source" had a definite meaning." In its brief to the Supreme Court, the
NRDC argued that the legislative history, the statutory provisions, and the congressional expressions of purpose are not ambiguous. 6 This same argument,
also made below by the environmental group, had been rejected by the Circuit
Court, though that court did agree that the agency rule was invalid.227 But
then, as the Supreme Court observed, the NRDC did "not defend the legal reasoning of the Court of Appeals." 2 8
In fact, not only did the NRDC fail to mount a strong legal defense in
support of the Circuit Court opinion, it acceded to the elements of what would
become the Chevron doctrine. It attempted to convince the Supreme Court to
establish a bright line test for determining the level of deference that a court
should give to the findings and conclusions of administrative agencies. "While
deference to an agency's interpretation of the law is common," the NRDC
argued to the Court, "the courts 'are not obliged to stand aside and rubber-

220. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
221. Id. at 840.
222. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

223. Id. at 723.
224. Id.
225. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 841.
226. See Brief for the Natural Resources Defense Council at 15-23, Chevron (No. 82-1005).

227. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
228. Id.
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stamp their affirmance of administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent
with a statutory mandate or that frustrate the congressional policy underlying a
statute.' ' 229 In fact, the Supreme Court did not disagree with this. Rather, it
has been the legal commentary of Chevron that has taken the opinion to new
heights, far beyond the Court's own analysis.
What did the Court say about the interpretation of statutory terms? First,
the Court reaffirmed the long standing, constitutionally consistent, role of the
judiciary that "[tihe judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction. . . ."' This is, in fact, perhaps the most important characteristic of
judicial power under our structural constitutional separation of powers as declared so imperatively by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison.23' "It
is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is . . .,,12 As mentioned previously, it has been the exercise of this judicial duty that has vindicated the Court's approval of the ever-expanding level of
Congress' delegation of authority to independent and non-political administrative bodies. It is important to keep in mind the close linkage between this delegation and judicial review. The clear rationalization found in Judge Leventhal's
concurring opinion filed in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA was shown above. 3 Judge
Leventhal's thinking most certainly merits repeating as part of the beneficial
context within which Chevron will further be reviewed. He stated, "In the case
of agency decision-making the courts have an additional responsibility set by
Congress. Congress has been willing to delegate its legislative powers broadly
- and courts have upheld such delegation - because there is court review to
assure that the agency exercises the delegated power within statutory limits . . . . ,,34

To remain true to the constitutional division of powers that relegates to the
courts the duty to define the law, the Court must always remain "the final authority on issues of statutory construction."' "5 Likewise, the Court must "decide all relevant questions of law, [and] interpret constitutional and statutory
provisions" if it is to respect the coordinate branch of government.236 Without
going into the details of each case, no evidence has been found that the Supreme Court has ever sharply strayed from its most basic and critical function
interpreting of the law, that is, unless Chevron is interpreted to be the
Marbury v. Madison of administrative law, allowing the administrative agency
to declare what the law is. Did the Supreme Court say in Chevron that it was
"emphatically the province and duty of the [administrative agency] to say what
the law is"?"37
229. Brief for the Natural Resources Defense Council at 9, Chevron (No. 82-1005) (quoting NLRB v.
Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291 (1965)).
230. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
231. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
232. Id. (emphasis added).
233. See supra notes 206-07 and accompanying text.
234. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Leventhal, J., concurring).
235. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984).
236. 5 U.S.C. §706 (1994).
237. For a comparison of the Chevron doctrine to Marbury v. Madison, see Sunstein, supra note 16, at
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A long and consistent line of cases clearly defines -the Court's exclusive
role of interpreting statutory terms and deciding all relevant questions of law. In
Adams Fruit Co, Inc. v. Barrett," the Court reaffirmed the principle that
"agency determinations within the scope of delegated authority are entitle to
deference," but in this recognition, the Court also continued to preserve its own
judicial role." 9 Recognizing some level of deference, the Court in Adams
Fruit offered this admonition: "[I]t is fundamental 'that an agency may not
bootstrap itself into an area in which it has no jurisdiction.""'2 Additionally,
the Court has cautioned: "Reviewing courts are not obliged to stand aside and
rubber-stamp their affirmance of administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrates the congressional policy underlying a statute. '
Chevron is not unique in giving deference to the expert administrative
tribunals. In FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 42 decided in 1965, the Court explained that the statutory scheme for protecting the economy from "unfair methods of competition, ' "necessarily gives the Commission an influential role
in interpreting Section 5 [of the FTC Act] and in applying it to the facts of
particular cases arising out of unprecedented situations.",2' The Court noted
that it "has frequently stated that the Commission's judgment is to be given
great weight by reviewing courts., 24' This then raised the following question:
How much deference should the reviewing courts give to agency interpretation
of statutory terms?
2*
In fact, this was a question that the Court in Skidmore v. Swift & Co. "
embellished upon, over fifty years ago, in 1944. The Court stated, "The weight
of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness
evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
persuade, if lacking power to control. 247 Skidmore is considered by the Court

2074.
238. 494 U.S. 638 (1990).
239. Id. at 650.
240. Id. (quoting Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U. S. 726, 745 (1973)).
241. NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291 (1965). See also SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 118 (1978);
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974); Volkswagenwerk v. Federal Maritime Commission,
390 U.S. 261, 272 (1968); FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965).
242. 380 U.S. 374 (1965).
243. Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 203, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719 (1914) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1958)). As first enacted in 1924, the substantive clause of Section 5 read: "That
unfair methods of competition in commerce are hereby declared unlawful." Id. In 1938, the Wheeler-Lea Act,
Pub. L. No. 447, § 5, 52 Stat. I11 (1938), expanded the scope of the FTC's jurisdiction with this amended
language: "Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are hereby declared unlawful."
244. Colgate-Palmolive,380 U.S. at 385.
245. Id.
246. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
247. Id. at 140. The Skidmore case involved the enforcement of a portion of the Fair Labor Standards
Act, for which the "Congress did not utilize the services of an administrative agency to find facts and to determine in the first instance whether particular cases fall within or without the Act." Id. at 137. In deciding de
novo whether waiting time was working time under the wage and hour laws, the question concerned the level
of deference that the court should give the Administrator's Interpretative Bulletin. Id.
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as its "most comprehensive statement" of the level of judicial deference that
should be given to agency "interpretative rulings, 24" and has been followed in
a long line of cases that predate Chevron.249
Even after Chevron, the Skidmore standard for deference continues to be
observed by the Court. In Lowe v. Securities Exchange Commission," the
Court, citing Skidmore, commented: "An agency's construction of legislation
that it is charged with enforcing is entitled to substantial weight, particularly
when the construction is contemporaneous with the enactment of the statute." Furthermore, the Supreme Court, long before Chevron, had refined the
doctrine of judicial deference to include a constitutionally imperative limitation
to this level of deference.
In Colgate-Palmolive, the Court explained that "while informed judicial
determination is dependent upon enlightenment gained from administrative
experience ...[statute terms] must get their final meaning from judicial construction. ' 1 2 An even clearer expression of the limitation on this deference
was given by the Court in American Ship Building Company v. NLRB. 3 That
Court offered this admonition: "The deference owed to an expert tribunal cannot be allowed to slip into a judicial inertia which results in the unauthorized
assumption by an agency of major policy decisions properly made by Congress. ,, 4
With the Court's long experience in measuring the limited deference that it
would give to agency decisions, what was it that made Chevron such a celebrated case? What the Court did in that case was perhaps to offer a clearer explanation of what it had long been doing. It divided into two separate steps the approach that a reviewing court should follow in its analysis of an agency's interpretation of statutory terms. The first step, explained the Court, was to determine whether "Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue."" If it has spoken, and if "the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end
of the matter." 6
Clearly, there is nothing new in this first step of Chevron. This first step is
nothing more than a recitation of one of the most basic rules of statutory interpretation. In fact, the Supreme Court announced in Cary v. Curtis, 7 decided
in 1845, that the "positive language of the statute, it is true, must control every

248. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976).
249. See Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 103-04 (1981); St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South
Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 783 n.13 (1981); SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 117-18 (1978); United States v. Consumer Life Ins. Co., 430 U.S. 725, 752 (1977); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 237 (1974); United States v.
Pennsylvania Industrial Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 674-75 (1973).
250. 472 U.S. 181 (1985).
251. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 216. See also EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257-58 (1991).
252. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965).
253. 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
254. Id. at 318. See also NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 292 (1965).
255. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
256. Id.
257. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236 (1845).
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other rule of interpretation."" s The Court stated: "To deny this position would
be to elevate the judicial over the legislative branch of the government. ' 9
Then, in Barnes v. The Railroads,2 6 the Court recited the basic interpretation
rule, that "where the language employed by the legislature is plain and free of
all uncertainty ... the statute speaks its own construction. 26' With respect to
the interpretation of statutory terms, "[n]othing is better settled than that in the
construction of a law its meaning must first be sought in the language employed." And, "[i]f that be plain, it is the duty of the courts to enforce the law
as written, provided it be within the constitutional authority of the legislative
body which passed it."262
The rule requiring courts to give obedience to the language of the statute is
a rule respecting the constitutional separation of powers. Furthermore, this fundamental canon of statutory construction was not altered in any way by the
Chevron case. The starting place for interpreting statutes is still with the language chosen by Congress.263 When the relevant statute "contains a phrase
that is unambiguous - that has a clearly accepted meaning in both legislative
and judicial practice - [the court will] not permit it to be expanded or conthe "'sole function
tracted." 2 Where the language is clear and unambiguous,
26
'
of the court is to enforce it according to its terms. '
In Chevron, the first step in the review of agency action was extended by
the Court beyond the reading of the literal language used by Congress. It explained that the reviewing court could employ the "traditional tools of statutory
construction [to ascertain whether] Congress had an intention on the precise
'
question at issue."266
This recognition of the "traditional tools of statutory
construction" further reduces the perceived and exaggerated impact of Chevron.
If administrative lawyers are to avoid the transfer of vast amounts of authority
to the agency, they must arm themselves with these "traditional tools" for reading and understanding statutes.267

258. Id. at 239.
259. Id. at 245.
260. 84 U.S. (17 Wall) 294 (1872).
261. Id. at 302.
262. United States v. Standard Brewery, Inc., 251 U.S. 210, 217 (1919).
263. See Pennsylvania Dept. of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 557-58 (1990); Mallard v.
United States Dist. Ct., 490 U.S. 296, 300 (1989).
264. West Virginia Univ. Hosp. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98 (1991).
265. Id. at 99 (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1917)). See also
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993); United States Nat'l Bank v. Independent Ins. Agents, 508
U.S. 439 (1993); Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos, 505 U.S. 469 (1992).
266. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984).
267. Perhaps the most traditional tool of construction, maybe even the most reliable, is the standard dictionary. "Dictionary definitions appeared in twenty-eight percent of the 107 Supreme Court cases decided by
published opinion in the 1992 Term - a fourteen-fold increase over the 1981 Term." Note, Looking It Up:
Dictionariesand Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1438 (1994). See also 2A SUTHERLAND
STAT CONST §§ 45.01-48.20 (Norman J. Singer ed., 5th ed. 1992); Archibald Cox, Judge Learned Hand and
the Interpretationof Statutes, 60 HARV. L. REV. 370 (1947); Jerome Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks
on Statutory Interpretation, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 1259 (1947); Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections On the
Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUti. L. REV. 527 (1947); Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417 (1898); Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks On The Theory of Appellate Decision and
The Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950); Russell L.
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Through a rational use of these traditional tools of statutory interpretation,
courts should be able to fasten a settled meaning to the very statute from which
the agency draws its power. In NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.,26 the Supreme
Court articulated a limit on the agency's discretion. The Court held that an
agency is not free "to read a new and more restrictive meaning into the Act,"
after the statute has acquired a settled meaning through prior administrative and
judicial interpretation." 9 In Neal v. United States,27 0 the Court stated: "Once
we have determined a statute's meaning, we adhere to our ruling under the
doctrine of stare decisis, and we assess an agency's later interpretation of the
statute against that settled law."27
Step one of the Chevron doctrine did not materially depart from the basic
traditions of statutory interpretation. Neither did step two which arises only
when "the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific" question at
issue. 272 Chevron's step two, giving deference to agency interpretation, was
not a substantial shift from the past. Douglas W. Kmiec, then Assistant Attorney General, observed: "The result in Chevron was arguably foreshadowed
forty years earlier in NLRB v. Hearst Publications,Inc."273 Kenneth W. Starr
offered this additional view: "At first blush, Chevron appears to be little more
than an application of long-standing Supreme Court precedent calling for courts
to defer to administrative interpretations absent strong reasons for not doing
'

SO. 1274

Step two of the Chevron doctrine is considered only when it is concluded
275
that "the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue.
But, of course, it must be remembered, the very determination of the presence
or absence of ambiguity within the language of a statute is, in itself, an interpretation. Sutherland Statutory Construction explains, "It is... widely acknowledged that.a statute is ambiguous only when it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in either of two or more senses.'2 76
Further, as Professor Sunstein observed, "the resolution of ambiguities in statutes is sometimes a question of policy .... ',2 It is in this instance that the

Weaver, JudicialInterpretationof Administrative Regulations:An Overview, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 681, 717-21
(1984); James M. Landis, A Note On "Statutory Interpretation,"43 HARV. L. REV. 886 (1930).
268. 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
269. Id. at 289.
270. 116 S. Ct. 763 (1996).
271. Id. at 768-69. See also NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 116 S. Ct. 450, 453-54 (1995);
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 536-537 (1992) (involving the interpretation of the statutory term
"employee" as used in the National Labor Relations Act).
272. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
273. Douglas W. Kmiec, JudicialDeference To Executive Agencies And the Decline of the Nondelegation
Doctrine,2 ADMIN. L.J. 269, 279 (1988).
274. Starr, supra note 19, at 292.
275. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
276. 2A SUTHERLAND STAT CONST § 45.02, at 6 (Norman J. Singer ed., 5th ed. 1992).
277. Sunstein, supra note 16, at 2086. See also, Eric M. Brown, Note, Coring The Seedless Grape: A
Reinterpretationof Chevron U.S.A. Inc v. NRDC, 87 CoLuM. L. REv. 986, 992 (1987).
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Court looks to see "whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute." 278
Elaborating on Chevron's step two, the Court offered this explanation: "If
Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the
statute by regulation."279 Then, for that instance, the Chevron Court offered
the prescription of what it considered to be the proper scope of review. "Such
legislative regulations," the Court explained, "are given controlling weight
280
unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.
Continuing, the Court added, "In such a case, a court may not substitute its own
construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency. a8s
As previously alluded to, Chevron did not break any truly meaningful new
ground. In fact, long before all the hullabaloo was raised and encircled this
"celebrated case," the Court had already established limited review of an
agency's interpretation of a statutory term. In Gray v. Powell,2 2 decided in
1941, the Court, upholding the agency's interpretation of the statutory term
"producer," as used in the National Bituminous Coal Act,283 stated:
Such a determination as is here involved belongs to the usual administrative routine. Congress, which could have legislated specifically as to
the individual exemptions from the code, found it more efficient to delegate that function to those whose experience in a particular field gave
promise of a better informed, more equitable, adjustment of the conflicting interests of price stabilization upon the one hand and producer con284
sumption upon the other.
The scope of judicial review in Gray v. Powell was just as limited as the
scope in Chevron. Justice Reed, writing for the Court, offered this explanation
of the proper level of review.
Unless we can say that a set of circumstances
to bring them within the concept "producer"
entrusted by Congress to the Commission as
exercise of judgment, it is the Court's duty
judgment undisturbed." 5

deemed by the Commission
is so unrelated to the tasks
in effect to deny a sensible
to leave the Commission's

Though similar in scope and substance to Chevron, Gray received little attention from legal scholars. Consequently, in tracing this 1941 decision of the

278. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.

279. Id. at 843-44.
280. Id. at 844.
281. Id.
282. 314 U.S. 402 (1941).
283. Pub. L. No. 48, 50 Stat. 72 (1937). The Act was intended to stabilize the price of coal at a time
when coal was a primary fuel in this country. See Eric Stein, Recent Decision, 40 MICH. L. REV. 1093 (1942).
An exemption from the price regulations was provided for coal consumed by the "producer." See Gray, 314

U.S. at 403.
284. Gray, 314 U.S. at 411-12.
285. Id. at 413 (emphasis added).
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Supreme Court through the Table of Cases in the Index To Legal Periodicals
for the years 1940 through 1946, only one law review article was found. 86
However, legal textbooks refer to this 1941 Supreme Court scope of re' It is not until
view of statutory terms as "the doctrine of Gray v. Powell."287
more than forty years later, as Chevron approached, that one finds increased
attention given the "Gray v. Powell doctrine" of judicial deference to administrative agencies.288 In 1944, the Supreme Court, in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 9 upholding the Board's interpretation of the statutory term "employee,"
had this to say: "It is not necessary in this case to make a completely definitive
limitation around the term 'employee.' That task has been assigned primarily to
the agency created by Congress to administer the Act." 2' 9
The Court, following the Gray v. Powell rationale, continued with its explanation of the appropriate level of judicial review stating, "[W]here the question is one of specific application of a broad statutory term in a proceeding in
which the agency administering the statute must determine it initially, the reviewing court's function is limited."29' This, then, is the limitation upon the
function of the Court: "[T]he Board's determination that specified persons are
'employees' under this Act is to be accepted if it has 'warrant in the record'
and a reasonable basis in law."2' This is what the Court said in Chevron.
The Court stated that "[sluch legislative regulations are given controlling weight
293
unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.
IV. CONCLUSION
So what does it all mean? If the Chevron doctrine means that the Court is
surrendering its constitutional and statutory responsibility to "decide all relevant
questions of law," the Court should as a corollary revisit and increase its scrutiny of the delegation issue. For, as shown above, the Court's review of agency
decisions is the very thing that validates the Court's approval of the delegation.
It is worthwhile to once again think back to Judge Leventhal's admonition in
his concurring opinion in Ethyl Corp. that "Congress has been willing to dele-

286. See Stein, supra note 283.
287. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

§ 10.32, at 696

(3rd ed. 1991); see also PETER L.

STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN & BYSE's ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS (9th ed. 1995).

288. See Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures,Standardof Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 193, 202 n.41 (1996); Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and
the Administrative State, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1044, 1082 (1984); Weaver, supra note 267, at 724; Angela R.
Freeman, Note, Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America: A PotentialBroadening of the Test ForSupervisory Status Under the NLRA, 31 TULSA L.J. 323, 338 n.133 (1995); Note, The FederalCommunications Commission and Interactive Cable Technology: The Case For Minimal Regulation, 97 HARV. L. REV. 565, 579
(1983).
289. 322 U.S. I11(1944).
290. Id. at 130.
291. Id. at 131.
292. Id. (emphasis added). See also Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1983).
293. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
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gate its legislative powers broadly - and courts have upheld such delegation
because there is court review.'294
The fact is that Chevron does not make any great departure from the judicial balance that the courts have made between the scope of judicial review and
the level of delegation permitted. In Chevron itself, the Court made it clear that
it was not surrendering its constitutional responsibility. It stated, albeit in a
footnote, that "It]he judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative construction which are contrary to clear
29 In Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Procongressional intent.""
grams v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.,296 the Court confirmed
this; Chevron does not authorize an agency to extend its jurisdiction beyond
that granted by statute."' The Court has made clear that "an agency's interpretation of a statute is not entitled to deference when it goes beyond the meaning that the statute can bear.""29 Justice O'Connor, concurring in Holly Farms
Corp. v. NLRB,2' had this to say: "None of our precedents sanction blind adherence to the Board's position
when it is directly contrary to the plain lan3°
guage of the relevant statute.: 0
The key to understanding the constitutional and statutory soundness of
Chevron, Hearst, and Gray v. Powell lies in the identification of the parts of the
opinions which are products of the Court's independent judgment, where no
deference was given to the administrative agencies. Look closely at the Chevron
opinion. One quickly finds that the Supreme Court spent considerable time both
in its independent analysis of the language of the relevant statutes and in its
review of the legislative history.0 ' The Court was establishing a "law record"
which was essential before the Court could measure the "reasonableness" of the
Agency's interpretation. In establishing the "law records" the Court was making
an independent determination, in complete compliance with the language of the
Administrative Procedure Act, of "all relevant questions of law.""3 2 This independent judgement of the Court is in fact the antecedent to the secondary determination of whether the agency decision is a "reasonable interpretation" - that
the decision is not "arbitrary or capricious." For without this predetermination
of some "law record" against which the agency's interpretation could be measured, it would be impossible for the reviewing court to determine if the agency
decision was arbitrary or capricious.

294. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 68 (D. C. Cir. 1976) (Leventhal, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
295. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
296. 115 S. Ct. 1278 (1995).
297. See id. at 1287.
298. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 114 S.Ct. 2223, 2231 (1994).
299. 116 S. Ct. 1396 (1996).
300. Id. at 1407 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
301. In Part III of the opinion, the Court began its review of the statutory scheme and the agency action.
See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 845-48 (1984). Then, in Part
IV, the Court examined the language of the statute. See id. at 848-51. Finally, in Part V of the opinion, the
Court examined the legislative history. See id. at 851-53.
302. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994).
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These are not abstract terms which allow a reviewing court to apply subjective analysis to agency decisions. In fact, it was such subjectivity that the
Court squarely rejected in Vermont Yankee, as "Monday morning
quarterbacking."3 3 As previously mentioned, before a court is competent to
decide whether an agency decision is unreasonable or arbitrary, it must first
establish a "law record" against which the decision can be objectively measured. 3" After all "[aImbiguity is a creature not of definitional possibilities but
of statutory context."305 An agency decision is unreasonable or arbitrary only
when it is without any rational basis in fact or in law. This is what the Court
stated in Hearst when it explained that "the Board's determination.., is to be
accepted if it has 'warrant in the record' and a reasonable basis in law."' °
Of course, whether the agency decision has "warrant in the record" requires a scope of review under the substantial evidence rule as explained in
Universal Camera. 7 In Universal Camera, the Court recognized that Congress, with its enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act, "left no room for
doubt as to the kind of scrutiny which a court of appeals must give the record
before the Board to satisfy itself that the Board's order rests on adequate
proof. '38 It explained that reviewing courts shall "hold unlawful and set aside
agency action" only when it is unsupported by substantial evidence" reading the
record as a whole. 3
Universal Camera, in regard to questions of fact, offers a close analogy to
Chevron, with respect to questions of law. As with Universal Camera, where
the reviewing court examines an agency's findings against a fact constructed record, Chevron examines the agency's interpretation of statutory terms against
the "law record" first constructed by the reviewing court. In Chevron, the Court
admonished administrative lawyers to review agency action against a legal
record, composed of statutory language and legislative history rather than
against some subjective model created by special interest groups.
Though vast quantities of words have already been written on Chevron,
there is still much more to do to elevate our understanding of what the Court
actually did. Yes, without a doubt, judicial review under Chevron still remains
an enigma.

303. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 547
(1978).
304. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991); Citizens To Preserve Overton
Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971); United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 243 (1946).
305. Brown v. Gardner, 115 S. Ct. 552, 555 (1994). In King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221
(1991), the Court stated: "[The meaning of statutory language, plain or not; depends on context." See also
MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co. 114 S. Ct. 2223 (1994).
306. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944).
307. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
308. Id. at 487.
309. Id. See also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1994).
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